This paper considers a problem of political economy in which a Nash equilibrium study is performed in a proposed game with restrictions where the two major parties in a country vary their position within a politically flexible framework to increase their number of voters. The model as presented fits the reality of many countries. Moreover, it avoids the uniqueness of equilibrium positions. The problem is stated and solved from a geometric point of view.
Introduction
Politics and governance consist not only in managing well, but also in generating strategies. Strategic planning of processes and political change calis for a rigorous analysis of the current situation, a clear definition of adversaries and supporters, and a precise analysis of power relations. In politics, when it comes to strategic action, tactical behavior and short-term action still prevail. For long-term conceptualization, implementing policies, and conducting campaigns, strategic planning is essential to achieve lasting success. Thus, political parties shape and vary their proposals within certain limits. These proposals are more relevant when they deal with issues in which citizens are especially interested during a certain period.
The aim of this study is to find equilibrium strategies to be followed by the two major parties of a country (government and opposition), enabling them to tune their proposals to a certain extent. Specifically, the Nash equilibrium study is proposed in a variation of the political competition game with neighborhood restrictions, as proposed by the authors in Abellanas et al. (2006) . The variation proposed in this work is focused on the consideration of neighborhoods for both parties who try to win the máximum number of voters. Thus, the movements of the opposing parties, p and q, are restricted by two sepárate circular neighborhoods B = C(x 0 ,r), B' = C(xi,r'), where C(x,R) is the circle with center x and radius R, which guarantee that both parties cannot adopt the same political strategies. This is important because it avoids undesirable equilibrium positions of the form (t, t) and also ensures that the parties do not deviate too much from their central ideological positions x 0 ,X], resulting in a more "partisan" outlining of the game than the Downs game considered, for example, in Roemer (2001) and Lillo et al. (2007) , where the parties are interested only in obtaining office.
The Nash equilibrium has been studied as a general model of competition. It was first stated by Nash in his dissertation Noncooperative games (Nash, 1951) as a way to obtain an optimum strategy for games with two or more players. Plott (1967) , Kramer (1973 ), McKelvey (1976 , and others have shown that pure-strategy Nash equilibria generally do not exist when competition takes place in a space of more than one dimensión.
Various approaches to search for a resolution to this situation have been reported in the literature, including mixed-strategy equilibria, uncovered sets, probabilistic voting, and valence criteria. See for example (Laver and Shepsle, 1996 , McKelvey, 1976 , Enelow and Hinich, 1982 , Lodregan and Romer, 1993 , Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2000 , Banks and Sundaram, 1993 , and Hinich and Munger, 1995 .
This work presents a discrete model of competition where examples with an infinite number of equilibrium positions are presented. The model can therefore be seen as an improvement on the classical games used in political economy. Due to the discrete nature of the presented game, the approach is developed using geometric techniques.
A simpler versión of the model has already been dealt with in previous work (Abellanas et al., 2006) , but has now been adapted to reflect better the reality of many countries. Both competing parties that constitute the major parties of a country are allowed to alter their political positions on two Ítems especially relevant for the citizens to obtain more followers. As for the choice of these two items, studying pre-election surveys can provide relevant information. To give an example, the problem of terrorism and questions related to immigration have recently become of immediate concern to the citizens of Spain. This became apparent in surveys carried out before the last elections. It should be noted that the authors do not consider that these two topics were decisive in the overall result of the elections, but that they can be important enough to deserve policy study by the parties.
Apart from these considerations, the most relevant contribution of this study as compared to previous work by the same authors is the investigation of the equilibrium in the proposed game.
The article is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the problem and develops the mathematical model with emphasis on its geometric analysis. In Section 3, necessary and sufficient conditions are presented for the equilibrium position to exist. Several practical examples are given which ¡Ilústrate various possibilities for equilibrium.
The model
In this work, the authors generalize the study of Nash equilibrium in a political-competition game that can be interpreted as a discrete versión of the Downs game (Downs, 1957; Roemer, 2001 ). This game is defined on a two-dimensional space where each point represents a different political position. The two players of the game represent political parties that choose their positions in the plañe so as to attract the largest possible number of voters. The voters are represented by n fixed points on the plañe.
It is assumed here that each player captures the points that lie closer to his position than to the other player's position. The perpendicular bisector of the line joining the players' locations thus partitions the plañe into two different voting regions. Each player wins the points in his own half-plane, and the winner will be the player whose región contains more points (Serra and Revelle, 1994; Smid, 1997; Aurenhammer and Klein, 2000; Okabe et al., 2000) .
The players are two parties denoted by p and q. Their locations in the policy plañe are denoted by U,t 2 , determined by the policies they offer. All the political positions appearing in the voter population are represented by a finite set of types H = {p-l ,... ,p"} c R 2 (Roemer, 2001; Abellanas et al., 2006) .
Voter preferences over the issue space are Euclidean, so the payoff functions in the game as presented are given by:
where d{t,p¡) is the Euclidean distance between policy t and position p¡. Both parties, p and q, will be allowed to vary their position within a neighborhood; that is, the movements of the opposing parties with initial positions x 0 ,x-¡ are restricted by two sepárate circular neighborhoods, B = B(x 0 , r), Bi = B(x-¡, ri It should be further noted that the selection of the margins of flexibility r, ri is conditioned by internal characteristics of the parties. The margin of flexibility of a party basically depends on the dominant faction (reformists, opportunists, or militants) in each party. A majority of opportunists yields a larger valué for r because they care only about winning elections, not about ideology. However, a party with a majority of militants has less political flexibility because militants are more partisan and want policies as cióse as possible to the ideal policy of the party.
The following section establishes the necessary or sufficient conditions for equilibrium in the proposed model.
Equilibrium with restrictions

Existence conditions
Let us start by looking at a proposition that is essentially the translation of the definition of Nash equilibrium for the gains of the proposed game. (Abellanas et al., 2006J and t 2 is also within the área ofBi of the máximum intersection.
Proposition 1. The equilibrium positions in the proposed game will be the positions (t-¡,t 2 ) such that t^ is within the área of B of the máximum intersection of circles centered on a voter whose radius is the distance between the voter and t 2
Proof. When q is located at t 2 , which is within the área of máxi-mum vote gain when p is at ti, it can be seen that if q moves to t, then n 2 (ti, t) =? El 2 (ti > Í2) and the same will happen with p.
• Proposition 2 provides a sufficient condition for the positions (ti,t 2 ) defined in the previous proposition to exist: Proof. In the positions noted, p beats the points p?, j = 1,..., k wherever q is within its neighborhood, and q beats the points pfj = k + 1,... , n wherever p is within its neighborhood. Then, if p moves, it cannot gain more than the k voters it has when q is in position t 2 , and the same situation exists for q; therefore, position {t-¡,t 2 ) is in equilibrium.
• Remarks 1. The previous result guarantees the existence of an infinite number of equilibrium positions for the cases described. This result contrasts with the uniqueness of the equilibrium positions, when they exist, in the usual definition of games without restrictions such as Downs' game. 2. The given condition is not necessary for the existence of equilibrium; that is, there may be equilibrium positions without this condition. These possible cases are referred to in Section 3.3. 3. To verify the condition established in Proposition 2, it is possible to use the geometric construction known as an arrangement of circles (de Berg et al., 1997) . This arrangement can be constructed using a randomized incremental algorithm with expected running time 0(n 2 ) (Edelsbrunner et al., 1992; Sharir and Agarwal, 1995) . When the circles that are part ofthe arrangement have a non-empty intersection, this condition will hold. Otherwise, information can be obtained about the área where the máximum number of voters can be secured for each party, wherever the other may be, by attaching a label to each cell of the arrangement that states the number of circles containing the cell. This can be done by means of a standard sweeping algorithm (Bentley and Ottmann, 1979) with running time 0(n 2 /ogn). 4. In the case of equidistance between the positions of both parties, the voter is assigned to the first one (see Section 2), and to guarantee that the position is in equilibrium, t 2 should be inside f| B).
j=k+l
The following result presents a necessary condition regarding the gains so that a certain position may be in equilibrium. Because the gains are considered complementary, only the gain condition for the first party is considered.
Proposition 3.1/ (ti,t 2 ) is an equilibrium position, then l < n 1 (ti 1^2) < n -''» where l is the máximum mtersection in B of C (pi,d(pi,Bt) ) and 1/ is the máximum mtersection in Bi of C(p t ,d(p t ,B) ),i=l,...,TL Proof. Let us suppose that there is an equilibrium position (U,t 2 ) with f] 1 (ti, t 2 ) < /. Then locating p at a position t in the máximum intersection of the sets B? ensures a gain n 1 (t, t 2 ) > l. This contradicts the fact that (U,t 2 ) is an equilibrium position.
If n 1 (ti, t 2 ) > n -/', then n 2 (ti, t 2 ) < /' (the gains are complementary); therefore, q can ensure a gain of // in a position ti in the máximum intersection of the sets BJ, thus improving its gain, which once more contradicts the fact that (ti, t 2 ) is in equilibrium.
• Remark. In the case where the sufficient conditions established in Proposition 2 are fulfilled, it is possible to verify that / + // = n, for which in the equilibrium positions (ti, t 2 ), n 1 (ti , t 2 ) = /.Proposition 4 provides a sufficient condition for non-equilibrium, that is, another necessary equilibrium condition. Proof. If there were an equilibrium position (t, ti), then either fj 1 (t, t') < § or n 2 (t, t') < \ would hold, because the gains are complementary. If, for example, \^{t, t') < \, then for the position t of the first party in B, there are points p. ,...,p, such that [j+i ' '? +1 f| C{pj.,d{pj., t)) n B' ¥= <j>. Placing the second party in that intersection, there is a gain of at least [ §] + 1 points í p^ ,... ,p JR ], and therefore the gain increases, which is a contradiction because the position was in equilibrium.
Proposition 4. if for all t e B, there exist [ §] +1 points between
• This condition is not very practical because it is necessary to determine whether or not it holds for all points in neighborhoods B and Bi, and therefore it must be checked for an infinite number of points. Proposition 5 provides a more useful variation of this condition because it identifies regions of B (and 0ÍB1) which cannot be part of an equilibrium position, which limits the áreas which must be searched for equilibrium positions. 
, and therefore C(pj.,d{p¡, ti)) D C(pj.,d{p¡, t)), so "n + C(p ij ,d(p ij ,ti))nB 'D"n C(p;.,d(j>;.,t) )nB'*<t>. Placing the i=l n-l+1 i=l second party in f| C(Pj.,d(Pj.,ti)) nB' guarantees at least ¡=1 n-l + 1 voters, improving the gain, which is a contradiction because (ti,t 2 ) was in equilibrium.
•
Non-uniqueness of equilibrium positions
Proposition 6 proves the non-uniqueness of equilibrium positions when they exist.
Proposition 6.
If there is an equilibrium position (ti,t 2 ) in the proposed game, then it is not unique.
Proof. Assume that p¡ x ,... ,p¡ are the voters of ti and p,-...,p¡ are the voters of t 2 . Then, because t 2 is inside C{pj.,d{pj., ti)) for i = k + 1,..., n, it is possible to look for a position ti for the second party in Bi which is cióse enough to t 2 for ti to be inside C{pj.,d{pj.,t-i)) for ¿ = fc +l,...,n and for ti to be inside C{pj., d{pj., t')) for i = 1,..., fe, where this is the área in B of máxi-mum gain when the second party is in ti.
It then holds that {U,ti) is also an equilibrium position by Proposition 1. •
Examples
The model proposed here has the advantage that, as noted in Remark 1 of Proposition 2, there may be voter positions where there are an infinite number of equilibrium situations for the parties. This enhances the possibilities of variation for the political positions of the rivals. Nevertheless, in this section, it will be seen that there are also examples with no equilibrium positions or with . 1 ); then the condition in Proposition 2 is not fulfilled.
It can also be seen that, whenever C(pi,R) intersects with C(p 2 ,S) forcertainR > d(pi,B/),S > d{p 2 ,Bi) (so they can intersect with Bi), some point of the intersection lies in B.
Then, for any position t 2 of the second party in Bi, it can be seen that C(pi,d(pi, t 2 )) n C(p 2 ,d(p 2 , t 2 )) has some point in B, because R = d(p,,t 2 ) >d(pi,B/),S = d(p 2 ,t 2 ) >d{p 2 ,Bi), and C(pi,d(pi, t 2 )) nC(p 2 ,d(p 2 , t 2 )) 5^ <p (h is in the intersection). Then, locating the second party in some of these points of B, the two points of the set will be reached in that intersection, and then any position (ti,t 2 ) with YV(h,t 2 ) < 2 is not in equilibrium. However, if p[ 1 (t 1 , t 2 ) = 2, the position (ti,t 2 ) is not in equilibrium either, because then n 2 (t 1; t 2 ) =0. Therefore, because C(pi,d(pi, ti)) nfi/ ^ <j> or C{p 2 ,d{p 2 , ti)) c\Bi ¥= <¡>, then if the second party is in C(pi,d(pi, ti)) c\Bi or in C(p 2 ,d(p 2 , ti)) nB/, whichever is not empty, it will win either p, or p 2 and improve its gain. Therefore, there is no equilibrium in this example. If the second party is on Xi, and the first one in, for example, B] (see Fig. 3 ), then the first party certainly has p-,, and it cannot have both by moving because C(pi, 9) n C(p 2 ,9) = {xi} and Xi 4 B. Then, in these positions, each party has a voter (p 2 is the payoff for the second party, with the first one being in B]: see Fig. 2 ), and neither party can improve its situation by moving, so the positions considered are equilibrium positions.
Remark. In general, for any n > 2, there are examples of positions of n points where there is no equilibrium, or where there is equilibrium without the sufficient condition being fulfilled. It is sufficient to take n -2 points whose máximum distance to B is less than the mínimum distance to Bi, such that B, 1 = B for all those points and the other two points in the positions of the two previous examples (using the flexible neighborhoods for the two parties as defined in these examples).
